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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
WILLIAM H. QUIRK, 1II*
RALPH K. HARRISON**

T

HE TASK of reviewing current developments in the field of
aviation law for 1976 in a single article presents a dual challenge; one must not only distinguish significant developments from
those of less importance, but one must also limit the substantive
areas surveyed to those which will be of interest to the greatest
number of readers. In pursuit of the latter goal, judicial decisions
have been divided into several categories. Any opinion as to which
of the many decisions reported during 1976 merit mention is
offered without benefit of the hindsight that only time and judicial
interpolation can provide. Nevertheless, these comments should
furnish the reader with a brief synopsis of some of the notable
developments of the past year.
AVIATION INSURANCE-COVERAGE

Perhaps no area of aviation law is more often the subject of
judicial interpretation than the construction of aviation insurance
policies. The growing complexity of private and commercial aviation, the number and variety of policy conditions and exclusions,
and the frequency of substantial losses are factors related to the
volume of aviation insurance litigation. In 1976 pilot clauses were
frequently the subject of controversy, and although the courts have
continued to follow the traditional practice of construing policy
questions against the insurance companies wherever possible, there
were a few exceptions.
* J.D., St. Mary's University School of Law, 1969; B.B.A., St. Mary's University, 1963.
** J.D., University of Texas School of Law, 1975; B.A., University of Houston, 1970.
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In Ranger Insurance Co. v. Phillips,' the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld coverage for the death of passengers being carried by
a student pilot, although the policy limited coverage to pilots
"holding proper pilot certificate(s) with appropriate ratings ... "
or to a pilot "who has a valid and effective pilot certificate." The
student pilot in control was clearly prohibited by regulations of
the Federal Aviation Administration from carrying passengers,"
and Ranger had argued that since he did not have a passengercarrying rating, passenger liability was excluded. In that same
case, Ranger also argued that coverage was excluded under a provision that the policy would not apply to the aircraft "while in
flight, unless its airworthiness certificate is in full force and effect."
The aircraft airworthiness certificate restricted its use to one person. The court rejected this circumstance as a basis, for exclusion
of coverage, stating that although the flight was clearly in violation
of the airworthiness certificate, the certificate remained in full
force and effect and that the insurer could have expressly provided that coverage would not apply upon violation of the certificate.
In Glover v. National Insurance Underwriters,"the Texas Supreme Court held that coverage was effective for a flight by a pilot
with a license restricted to visual flight rules (VFR) flights, even
when the pilot knowingly flew into an instrument flight rules (IFR)
area. In that case, the policy pilot clause provided coverage when
the aircraft was operated by an insured pilot "while properly rated
for the flight and the aircraft," and the majority of the court held
that although the VFR-rated pilot, who took off under VFR conditions, flew into IFR conditions and crashed in IFR conditions, the
policy language requiring the pilot to be properly rated for the flight
for coverage to apply was not specific enough to exclude coverage.
The majority held that the VFR conditions at the point where the
flight began established the nature of the entire flight as VFR,
even though IFR conditions were encountered during as much as
125 Ariz. App. 426, 544 P.2d 250 (1976).
2 14 C.F.R. § 61.89 (1977).
' Compare Ranger Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 454 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1971) with
Beguette v. National Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 429 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1970).
4 545 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1977).
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two-thirds of the flight. Like the Arizona court in Phillips,5 the
Texas court would have required greater specificity, i.e., a provision that coverage was suspended by a violation of FAA regulations. A vigorous dissent argued that the pilot received weather
information before beginning the flight which indicated IFR
weather was forecasted, that IFR weather was thereafter encountered, and that the pilot negligently failed to return to the point of
departure or alternative VFR airports, but flew into an IFR area
with full knowledge of the condition. If the entire flight is to be
viewed as a whole in determining IFR or VFR character, then the
policy language stating "while properly rated for the flight" would
require proper rating for all segments of the flight.
The California Supreme Court held in National Insurance Underwriters v. Carter' that the specific language of the pilot clause
limiting coverage to flights piloted by the named insured, followed
by the names of the owner-pilot and his wife, overrode general
language of the insuring clause providing coverage while the aircraft was flown by permissive users. A lengthy and vigorous dissent argued that the incongruity between the insuring clause and
the pilot clause created an ambiguity that should be resolved
against the insurer.
In Buestad v. Ranger Insurance Co.,' a Washington Court of
Appeals rejected the contentions of a student pilot who crashed
into two parked aircraft and sought liability protection as omnibus
insured under a policy issued to the owners of the aircraft he was
operating. In Buestad, the policy coverage included, in a section
entitled "Purposes and Use," use in student instruction and rental,
but under the "Definition of Insured," it specifically excluded liability coverage to renter pilots during rental for remuneration.
The court reasoned that the "Purposes and Use" clause referred
only to the authorized uses of the aircraft by the named insureds,
while it was the purpose of the "Named Insureds" clause to define the persons insured. The court indicated that the named insured was covered for liability arising under the "Purposes and
Use" clause, but that this did not extend liability coverage to the
5 25 Ariz. App. 426, 544 P.2d 250 (1976).

131 Cal. Rptr. 42, 551 P.2d 362 (1976).
15 Wash. App. 754, 551 P.2d 1033 (1976).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

renter pilot, as the definition of insured clearly excluded coverage

to renter pilots. 8
Employee exclusion clauses were the subject of a 1976 decision
by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Utica Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Emmco Insurance Co.' The court held that where employees of
one named insured sought damages against an additional named
insured," an exclusion clause barring claims of any employee of
"the insured" did not bar coverage. After a detailed discussion of
the differing opinions on this issue, the court distinguished two
earlier Minnesota cases" which had barred employee claims against
a non-employer insured, noting that a severability of interests
clause was contained in the policy in issue."
In Schepps Grocer Supply, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co.," a
Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that there was no coverage for
a loss occurring when a multi-engined aircraft was piloted by a
pilot without a multi-engine rating. The policy contained an exclusion for flights by pilots other than those set forth in the pilot
clause, and the pilot clause restricted insured pilots to those
possessing a multi-engine rating.' 4 The court held that coverage
I But see Miller v. Ranger Ins. Co., 27 Mich. App. 375, 183 N.W.2d 621
(1970). See also Davis, Aviation Insurance Policy Problems, SMALL AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT LITIGATION (A.B.A. Press 1974).
9243 N.W.2d 134 (Minn. 1976).
"0The clause read:
THIS POLICY DOES NOT APPLY AND NO COVERAGE IS
AFFORDED: UNDER COVERAGES A, C, AND D . . .
(8) to bodily injury to, sickness, disease, or death of any employee
of the insured while engaged in the employment of the insured.
243 N.W.2d at 138.
11Fuchs v. Cheeley, 285 Minn. 356, 173 N.W.2d 358 (1969); G.C. Kohlmier,
Inc. v. Mollenhauer, 273 Minn. 126, 140 N.W.2d 47 (1966).
"
4. SEPARATE INSUREDS: The insurance afforded under the coverages set forth above apply separately to each insured against
whom claim is made or suit brought .....
243 N.W.2d at 140 (emphasis added by the court).
See also Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 455 S.W.2d
714, 719 (Tex. 1970) and Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1 (1970).
1 543 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
"4The pertinent provisions of the policy are:
7. Pilot Clause: Only the following pilot or pilots holding valid
and effective pilot and medical certificates with ratings as required
by the Federal Aviation Administration for the flight involved will
operate the aircraft in flight: Lamar Masterson, providing he obtains a multi-engine rating with at least twenty-five hours dual flight
instruction in the insured make and model with a certified flight in-
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was ineffective while the aircraft was being flown by a pilot without
the required rating, regardless of whether such violation was a
proximate cause of the accident.
Construing North Dakota law, a federal court held in British
Aviation Insurance Co. v. Troftgruben" that a showing of proximate cause was not required for the insurer to escape liability when
the pilot of the insured aircraft was operating the aircraft while
his ability was impaired by alcohol. The policy stated, "This policy
does not apply . . . while the aircraft is: (c) operated by a pilot
whose ability is impaired by alcohol or a drug." This language,
the court wrote, in effect created a condition precedent to coverage, i.e., that the aircraft be operated by a pilot whose ability is
not impaired by alcohol or a drug. The court rejected an argument by the plaintiff based upon a North Dakota statute"' that
where a peril is excepted specially by contract of insurance, a
showing of proximate cause is required for the insurer to escape

liability.
In Kalamazoo Aviation, Inc. v. Royal Globe Insurance Co., "
an insurer had denied coverage for an aircraft damaged by the
pilot in an effort to escape pursuing United States Customs officers.
The insurer relied on a policy provision excluding liability for
any damage to the aircraft arising from attempted arrest of the
pilot by government agents. This argument was rejected by the
court, which affirmed the trial court's holding that the damage to
the aircraft was covered by the policy, as the damage was caused
by the reckless and unlawful flight of the pilot and not by any
act of the detaining party.

structor pilot prior to solo, and providing he obtains at least ten
hours solo in the insured make and model prior to carrying passengers; otherwise, commercial multi-engine and instrument-rated pi-

lots having a minimum of fifteen hundred total logged hours including at least two hundred fifty hours in multi-engine aircraft.

545 S.W.2d at 14 (emphasis added by the court).
14 Av. Cas. 17,426 (D.N.D. 1976).
' N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-06-03 (1970)
provides: "When a peril is excepted
specially in a contract of insurance, a loss which would not have occurred but

for such peril thereby is excepted although the immediate cause of the loss was
a peril which was not excepted."
1770 Mich. App. 267, 245 N.W.2d 754 (1976).
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-DISCOVERY RULE

In Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc.,18 an Illinois appellate court held
that the two-year statute of limitation of the Illinois Wrongful
Death Statute did not begin to run until the date that the aircraft
wreckage was discovered. The aircraft in question left on a flight
to the Bahama Islands and was last heard from on March 23,
1969. It was not until November 1971, two years and eight months
later, that the aircraft wreckage was found. The administrator of
the estates of two of the passengers filed suit against the aircraft
owner, Sport Aero, Inc., on March 29, 1971, and against the pilot,
Fey, on May 5, 1972. The court rejected defendant Fey's plea of
limitations, reasoning that no legal presumption of the deaths of
the aircraft passengers had arisen prior to suit, that no circumstances indicating the cause of deaths were known prior to the
discovery of the wreckage, and that no undue advantage would
accrue to either the plaintiff or the defendant by application of
the discovery rule under the circumstances in this case.
NEGLIGENCE LAW AND DAMAGES

The duties of airport owners and operators were discussed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Hunziker v. Scheidemantle.19 This case concerned a fatal crash
occurring shortly after take-off in a dense fog. The court affirmed
a directed verdict in favor of the defendant lessor/municipal
authority, which exercised no supervision over airport operation,
but reversed a directed verdict in favor of the defendant airport
lessee/operator, holding that since the lessee had closed the airport on prior occasions of bad weather, his failure to do so on the
date of the crash could be construed as negligence.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
8
Felder v. United States,"
affirmed a trial court finding of negligence
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 1 based on the failure of the
FAA tower personnel to warn the pilot of a Piper Comanche prior
1842 Il1. App. 3d 330, 355 N.E.2d 686 (1976).

1"543 F.2d 489
20 543 F.2d 657
18,179 (M.D. Ga.
2128 U.S.C. §§

(3d Cir. 1976).
(9th Cir. 1976). See also Neal v. United States, 13 Av. Cas.
1975).
1346(b) & 2674 (1970).
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to take-off of the presence of wake turbulence from a Boeing 707
which had preceded it on the same runway. However, the court

then held that the award of damages was so excessive that it
amounted to punitive damages against the government. The court's
reason was that the effect of federal and state income taxes was
not considered in awarding compensation for lost income and support. 2 The court proceeded to reduce the award of damages in an

opinion notable for its elaborate speculation as to how much the
decedents might have paid in federal and state income taxes had
they survived.
In Udseth v. United States,'" the United States Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court holding that liability
for a crash would not be imposed on the pilot in command if it
were uncertain whether the student or the instructor was piloting
the aircraft at the time of the crash. The court also rejected the
plaintiff's contention that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
applicable, noting that New Mexico law did not allow a presumption that a pilot in command is in exclusive control of an airplane
regardless of whether he is flying it."
In Humphreys v. Tann,u a federal district court chose to follow
the precedent of Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.," and held both

that in wrongful death actions arising from a mid-air collision, a
uniform federal rule of contribution and indemnity among joint tortfeasors should be applied rather than a particular state law selected
by conflict of law principles and that apportionment of damages
22 The court concluded from the legislative history of the Federal Tort Claims
Act that its intent was to provide compensation only and that an award of punitive damages was therefore unauthorized.
- 530 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1976).
24The court quoted language in Hisey v. Cashway Supermarkets, Inc., 77
N.M. 638, 426 P.2d 784 (1967) that:
The factual basis necessary as a premise for application of res ipsa
loquitur requires proof that (1) plaintiff's injury was proximately
caused by an agent [sic]
or instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendant ....
The absence of any evidence, or reasonable inference to be drawn
from evidence that this accident is the kind which ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of the negligence of someone alone defeats the application of the doctrine . ...
530 F.2d at 862 (emphasis by the Circuit Court).
2" 13 Av. Cas. 18,229 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
22504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); noted in
41 J.AIR L. & COM. 347 (1975).
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among the joint tort feasors should be on a comparative negligence
basis. The district court echoed the rationale expressed in Kohr
that such rules are mandated by the predominate federal interest
in regulating the national airways and by the need for uniformity
in light of the vague and differing state laws in these areas.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting
en banc, divided sharply over the issues presented in Miree v.
United States." In Miree, the various plaintiffs sued the United
States and DeKalb County, among others, for damages arising
from the crash of a Lear Jet shortly after take-off from DeKalbPeachtree airport. The crash allegedly was due to ingestion by the
plane's engine of a large number of birds swarming over the airport and the adjacent county garbage dump. The plaintiffs sought
to recover damages on theories of negligence, nuisance, and breach
of contract between the FAA and DeKalb County, whereby the
county agreed to maintain the airport and adjacent areas in a condition which would not interfere with the safe use of the airport.
The district court dismissed the claims against the county, holding
that the county was immune from suit by virtue of sovereign immunity. On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit ' agreed
that the county was immune from suits based on negligence and
nuisance, but a two-judge majority, with Judge Dyer dissenting,
held that the county was vulnerable to suit based on breach of
contract and that applying Georgia law, the plaintiffs could sue
the county for its failure to maintain the area adjacent to the airport as third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the county
and the FAA.
The Fifth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, agreed that the
county was immune from suit in negligence and nuisance, but
adopted the dissenting opinion of Judge Dyer, holding that federal
common law, rather than Georgia law, controlled the interpretation
of the contract between the United States and DeKalb County
and that federal common law would not allow recovery under the
contract by the public as third-party beneficiaries unless the contract clearly manifested such an intent. Five judges joined in
a dissent from the per curiam reversal, stating that the contract
27

538 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1976).

28 526 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1976).
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should be construed according to Georgia law, but that nevertheless, even under federal common law, members of the public
should be allowed recovery for breach as third-party beneficiaries.
The dissenters argued that the air-traveling public was the only
class of persons that could reasonably be expected to benefit from
the safe maintenance of the airport and adjacent area.
STRICT LIABILITY

In Bruce v. Marlin-Marietta Corp. and Ozark Airlines, Inc.,"
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed
a summary judgment in favor of a defendant aircraft manufacturer.
The plaintiffs contended that the 1952 model aircraft was unreasonably dangerous in two respects; first, the seats and seat
fasteners were not designed or manufactured to withstand a crash,
and second, the aircraft was not designed so as to minimize the
possibility of fire occurring after a crash. The court held that the
aircraft in question had met all design and safety regulations of
the Civil Aviation Agency in 1952, even though today's consumer
might reasonably expect safer designs and conditions."0
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in Langham v. Beech Aircraft
1
Corp.,"
considered a question of law certified to it by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and held that a New
Mexico statute,' which authorized recovery of damages from the
owner of a public conveyance for the wrongful death of a passenger, is not the exclusive remedy for a plaintiff, but that suit may
also be brought under the New Mexico Wrongful Death Statute'3
against the aircraft manufacturer for defects in the aircraft.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF REGULATORY AGENCIES

In Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.," the United States Supreme
Court expanded the remedies available to airline passengers who
29544 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1976).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965),

states:

"The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."
3 88 N.M. 516, 543 P.2d 484 (1976).

'N.M. STAT.
3

N.M. STAT.

ANN. S
ANN.

22-20-4 (Supp. 1973).

S 22-20-1

-426 U.S. 290 (1976).

(1953).
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are "bumped" from flights on which they have confirmed reservations. Ralph Nader brought suit for damages under state common
law for fraudulent misrepresentation as well as a statutory action3
for violation of boarding rules filed by Allegheny with the Civil
Aeronautics Board. The district court awarded damages based on
both claims, ' but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the judgment,"' remanded for additional fact
finding, and stayed proceedings in the district court on Nader's
misrepresentation claim, pending rulemaking proceedings by the
CAB. The only issue reaching the Supreme Court was the stay of
proceedings on the misrepresentation action. The court reversed
the stay order of the court of appeals, rejecting the argument that
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that the regulation of
over-booking practices be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the appropriate administrative agency and noting that considerations of uniformity in regulation and of technical expertise do not
call for prior reference to the CAB in this instance.
The holding of Nader was considered by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Kappelman v. Delta Airlines," where the court affirmed a district court
refusal to grant an injunction requiring a warning to passengers of
the shipment of radioactive materials on passenger flights. The
court said that the need for uniformity and a tribune of special
competence made the rulemaking procedure a more appropriate
means of resolving the problems raised.
Am CARRIER LIABILITY
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention" underwent judicial
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §S 1301
et seq. (1970 & Supp. 1975), formerly Civil Aviation Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch.
601, 52 Stat. 973.
"o Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973).
87 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
88 539 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"Article 17 provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking (emphasis added).
Warsaw Convention, signed Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934), T.S. No. 876,
137 L.N.T.S. 11.
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examination by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.'" The issue
was whether passengers lined up in the airport transit lounge to
undergo personal search prior to embarking were "in the operation
of embarking" when machine-gunned by terrorists. The court analyzed the issue in light of the carrier's control over the passengers
at the time of attack and the inherent risk in existence at that
point in time and held that the carrier was liable under the Convention for injuries arising from the attack."
Last year in Davis v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,' the New Hampshire Supreme Court held unlawful an exclusion in a tariff for injury
to animals being transported, while in Weiner v. British Overseas
Airways Corp.,"' a New York Supreme Court rejected a claim
against an air carrier arising from an injury allegedly due to a
defective rental automobile furnished as a part of a tour package.
In light of a comprehensive disclaimer of liability by the air carrier
in the tour brochure, the court held that the automobile renter was
an independent contractor and that the limitation of liability contained in the tour brochure was a specific disclaimer of any responsibility to plaintiff except while she was a passenger on its aircraft.
Finally, in Reed v. Wiser," a federal district court held that the
limitation of liability by a carrier by the Warsaw Convention operates only to limit the liability of the carrier itself and does not protect agents or employees of the carrier who are negligent.
TAXATION
Last year saw decisions involving a rigid application of use taxes
on aircraft owners.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held in Skelton v. Federal Express
Corp." that aircraft brought into Arkansas temporarily, for the
F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1976).
"See also Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 989 (1976). The Evangelinos opinion may be contrasted to other
decisions holding that carriers were not liable for an attack on passengers who had
disembarked and had reached the terminal building. MacDonald v. Air Canada,
40550

439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971). In Re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154 (D.C.P.R.

1975).
-116

N.H. 429, 362 A.2d 208 (1976).

14 Av. Cas. 17,489 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
"414

F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

'531

S.W.2d 941 (Ark. 1976).
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sole purpose of structural modification, were thereby subject to the
Arkansas use tax ' of three percent of their purchase price."' In
Sundstrand Corp. v. Department of Revenue, "' the Illinois Appel-

late Court upheld imposition of the Illinois use tax 9 on an aircraft
purchased outside Illinois and delivered into Illinois one day for
use almost exclusively in interstate flights beginning the next day.
The court held that the taxable event occurred between the moment
of delivery of the aircraft to the state and the next day, when its use
in interstate operations began.
With regard to property taxation, a Texas Court of Civil Appeals
held in Irving Independent School District v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,"
that the leasehold interest of an air carrier in a service and main-

tenance facility at a municipal airport is exempt from local taxation as a public transportation facility.
AIRPORT ZONING AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

The Illinois Supreme Court"l last year held unconstitutional a
city zoning ordinance restricting access to a privately-owned, publicly-operated airport to aircraft of 60,000 pounds or less, finding
that there was no reasonable basis for the restriction. Another
Illinois municipal ordinance, upheld by an Illinois Appellate
Court," imposed height restrictions on structures in the vicinity of
airports. The court rejected arguments that the restrictions were
arbitrary and unrelated to the public health, safety, or welfare, and
§ 84-3105(a) (1960) provides for a 3% use tax on:
[A]ny article of tangible personal property, . . . purchased for storage, use, or consumption in this State ....
This tax will not apply
with respect to the storage, use or consumption of any article of
tangible personal property purchased, produced or manufactured
outside this State until the transportation of such article has finally
come to rest within this State or until such article has become commingled with the general mass of property of this State.
"The Arkansas General Assembly promptly amended the Use Tax to exempt aircraft brought into the state for modification or repair, if removed within
sixty days. 1975 Ark. Acts (Extended Sess. 1976), No. 1237, §§ 1-2 (codified as
amendment to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-3105(a)).
434 Ill. App. 3d 694, 339 N.E.2d 351 (1975).
"°ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 439.3 (1974 & Supp. 1977), Act of July 14, 1955,
1955 Ill. Laws, § 3.
50534 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1 County of Cook v. Poiester, 62 Ill. 2d 357, 342 N.E.2d 41 (1976).
"La Salle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 34 Ill. App. 3d 264, 340 N.E.2d
79 (1975).
"°ARK. STAT. ANN.
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that the restrictions were equivalent to taking property for public
use without compensation.
Similarly, a federal district courte3 upheld a municipal ordinance
forbidding use of a municipal airport between the hours of 11:00
p.m. and 7:00 a.m. by aircraft which exceed a noise level of 75
dba. The court rejected contentions that the ordinance was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, and that the ordinance invaded an area pre-empted by federal law. The holding of
the United States Supreme Court in Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal" was distinguished on the grounds that the regulation
there was imposed by a non-proprietor municipality and that the
federal pre-emption of this area of regulation does not include
restrictions on airport use imposed by the proprietors of airports.
STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

A few of the significant statutory and administrative developments of 1976 in the aviation field are summarized below. The list
is not intended to be exhaustive, but it represents some of the highlights of the past year.
FederalRule Making
I. New Traffic Management System
In response to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposals for new aircraft noise abatement operating procedures at
airports, the FAA has adopted a new, comprehensive air traffic
management program entitled "Local Flow Traffic Management.' 5
The new FAA program is designed to reduce low altitude flying
time by jet aircraft in terminal areas and incorporates such features as increased use of idle or near-idle thrust descents, metering
aircraft into terminal areas consistent with airport acceptance rates,
absorbing unavoidable delays at or above 10,000 feet, standardized
arrival procedures, and earlier climb-outs for departing aircraft.
"5National

Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
Burbank involved a "curfew" which, in the absence
of an emergency, forbade any pure jet aircraft from taking off from privately
owned Hollywood-Burbank Airport between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00
a.m.
u41 Fed. Reg. 52,393-96 (1976).
4411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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II. Noise Standards
On October 28, 1976, the FAA published a notice of proposed
rule-making regarding recommended noise level standards submitted to it by the EPA." The rule is directed to turbojet-engine
powered airplanes and large propeller-driven airplanes.
III. Air Carriage of Hazardous Materials
In 1976 the Department of Transportation's Materials Transportation Bureau made extensive changes in its rules regarding the
air carriage of hazardous materials."' Changes include the circumstances under which certain materials may be carried by air, as
well as special labeling, handling, and containerization requirements for substances defined as hazardous by the rules.
CAB Air Freight Liability and Claims Rules
On March 22, 1976, the CAB issued its decision in the first
comprehensive examination of air carrier rules and practices concerning liability for air frieght." In summary, the CAB's decision
makes United States carriers strictly liable for freight loss, damages, or delay, without regard to negligence, subject to specified
exceptions. The CAB also found that the fifty cent per pound
liability coverage limit in effect since 1946 was unreasonably low
and ordered a new minimum figure of $9.07 per pound per piece
as the amount which United States air carriers must pay for loss,
damage, or delay when the shipper chooses not to pay for extra
coverage. The CAB decision prescribes many additional new rules
and changes with respect to a variety of matters such as liability for
special and consequential damages, notice of claims for concealed
losses or damage, and charges assessed by carriers for shipments
they route.
Airport and Airway Development Act Amendment of 1976 Signed
President Ford signed into law the Airport and Airway Development Act Amendment of 1976," which extended through
1980 the program for improvement of the nation's public airports
U FAA Rulemaking Notice, 41 Fed. Reg. 47,378 (1976).
'741 Fed. Reg. 15,972 (1976) (to be codified in 49 C.F.R. §§ 170-75).
"The complete text may be found in [1976] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,204,
at 14,764-96.
so Pub. L. No. 94-353, 90 Stat. 871 (1976).
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and airway facilities. The new law amended both the Airport and
Airway Development Act of 1970" and the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958"' in a number of significant areas, including funding formulas, grant procedures, and grant eligibility.

0049 U.S.C. § 1701 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
0149

U.S.C. 5 1301 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

